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Abstract
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to
mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations
of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the
preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both
numerically and analytically.
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Game theory [1] has become a fruitful source of inspiration for both physicists
and economists in recent times. The idea of Nash equilibria [2], as opposed
to the minimisation of an Hamiltonian, is a powerful tool to investigate the
behaviour of selfish agents aiming to maximise their individual utility. A Nash
Equilibrium is a state in which any variation of an agent’s strategy results in a
worse performance for herself, the other agents’ strategies being unchanged. A
growing effort is being devoted to analyzing situations in which only a subset
of possible strategies can be explored, due to the limited capabilities of real
agents [3], that is a source of market inefficiency [4]. The Stable Marriage
Problem provides a simple and natural environment to represent agents with
bounded rationality.
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The Stable Marriage Problem [5] describes a system where two classes of N
players (e.g., men and women) have to be matched pairwise. Each player is
been assigned his/her list of preferred partners. In the original model, the lists
are drawn at random and are independent from one another. If manm marries
woman w we attribute him an energy equal to the ranking of w in m’s list.
This way each player tends to minimise his/her energy, or unhappiness. Let
us define the matrices f (for women) and h (for men), such that the element
f(w,m) denotes the rank of man m in w’s list and h(m,w) the rank of woman
w in m’s list. We call stable state a collection of couplesM = {(m,w)i}i=1,...,N
where there is no man mi and no woman wj , members of two different couples
(i and j), who would both prefer to marry each other rather than staying with
their respective partners. The energies per person for women (f) and men (h)
in a given matching are defined by
ǫf =
1
N
N∑
w=1
f(w,m) (1)
and
ǫf =
1
N
N∑
m=1
h(m,w), (2)
and we will consider their averages over many instances of the preference lists.
Many numerical studies are based on the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (GSA) [6].
According to the GSA, the agents of one class propose to marry to the agents
of the other class, who judge whether to accept or not. This algorithm finds
the stable state with the minimal proponents’ energy. In the man-oriented
GSA, man m makes a proposal to the first woman on his list. If she accepts,
they get engaged; if she refuses m goes on proposing to the next woman on
his list. Conversely, woman w accepts a proposal if she is not engaged or if
she is engaged with a man m′ worse ranked (in her list) than the proponent.
In this case, m′ restarts proposing to the following women in his list.
When all men have run through their lists and all women are engaged, the
algorithm stops and the resulting matchingMh is stable. Of course, the algo-
rithm could also be run reversing the roles and proponents are always better
rewarded. Indeed, it is possible to derive a general relation between the ener-
gies of women and men in a stable state. Through a mean-field approach, it
has been shown in [7] and [8] that the energy of men is
ǫh = logN + 0.5772 (3)
and that the energy of women ǫf can be determined by the relation ǫf = N/ǫh,
2
which holds for all stable matchings.
A more general case is represented in [9] where the preference lists are corre-
lated in such a way that certain agents rank, on average, higher than others.
This amounts to provide them with an intrinsic characteristic, which we shall
call beauty. Lists are built as follows: for each man m, woman w is assigned a
score µm+Uµw, where µm and µw are random variables uniformly distributed
in the range [0, 1] and U is a parameter tuning the effect of beauty. The wish
list of player m results from ordering all the scores thus obtained. Setting
U = 0, one recovers the original uncorrelated model. One observes [9] that,
as U is increased, the average total energy grows. Moreover, the energy gap
between proponents and judges decreases, while an inequality is introduced in
the energies of ”beautiful” and ”ugly” agents, regardless their role.
The Stable Marriage Problem has been widely studied as a model of econom-
ical systems, since it mimics agents maximising their individual utility in a
competing environment. As pointed out by behavioural economists [3], the
cost of information has to be taken into account. Since agents can exert a
finite effort, the exploration of all possible alternatives is bounded. The effects
of limited information in matching problems are investigated in a following
paper [10] with a more general approach.
In our sex-oriented marriage problem, one can bound the rationality of agents
by arranging them on a regular lattice of linear dimension L and assuming
that they only know partners within a given euclidean distance d. Unreachable
individuals (who may happen to be the best ranked ones) figure as holes in the
wish lists. Under this assumption, each agent only knows a fraction α ∼ ( d
L
)K
of the total number of agents, where K is the lattice dimension.
In a GSA with ”full” lists, the energy of a man equals the number of proposals
needed to get married. If lists are ”sparse”, each subsequent proposal results
in adding 1
α
, on average, to his energy. The energy of men, in this case, equals
the number of proposals divided by α. If we follow the same procedure of [7],
neglecting correlations between the position of the holes, we find
ǫh(α) =
αǫf (α)
N [1− (1−
ǫf (α)
N
)α]2
(4)
where
ǫH(α) =
1
α
(logN + 0.5772) (5)
These relations are verified by numerical simulations, as shown in figure 1 and
2.
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Fig. 1. Energy of men averaged over 200 realizations as a function of α in a bidimen-
sional model with N = 2500 plotted on log-log scale. “Plus” symbols correspond to
simulation data. The solid line is obtained from eq. (5).
We investigated both numerically and analytically a generalised Stable Mar-
riage Problem. First we assigned an individual beauty to the agents, which
results in correlated preference lists. This correlation smoothes the favorable
edge of proponents but introduces an energy gap related to the intrinsic feature
of agents. Then, we studied a model where agents have an incomplete infor-
mation about potential partners. We show that a richer information implies a
greater competition, but also a lower average energy.
References
[1] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, (Cambridge,
Massachusets; 1991).
[2] J. Nash, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 36, 48 (1950).
[3] H.A. Simon, Bounded Rationality in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary
of Economics, Ed. by J. Eatwell, M.Milgate and P.Newman, Macmillan
(London,1987), 1 226.
[4] Y.-C. Zhang, Toward a Theory of Marginally Efficient Markets, Physica A 269
30 (1999).
[5] D. Gusfield and R.W. Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and
Algortihm, The MIT Press (Cambridge, Massachusets; London, UK; 1989)
4
70 80 90 200100
εf
5
6
7
8
9
10
20
εh
Fig. 2. Energy of men and women in stable matchings in a one dimensional model
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